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Отметим слова Виткевича: свободный ото лжи. На этой максиме настаивает фи-
лософ, создавший онтологию, в которой неискоренимый дуализм Бытия становится 
основанием дисгармонии между Бытием как целым и Единичным существованием. 
Однако начало, примиряющее с абсолютом и приближающее к глубочайшей сути 
бытия, существует. Это — искусство как метафизическая сфера существования...
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STANISŁAW BRZOZOWSKI AND THE ENDS OF THOUGHT
В статье датется толкование философским работам польского мыслителя Станислава Бр-
жозовского (Brzozowski, 1878–1911). Его мысль была направлена против претензий пози-
тивизма, и выводы польского философа сопоставимы с идеями Ницше и Бергсона. Однако 
проблема Бржозовского была  в том, что его мысли не могли выбраться из тавтологичес-
кого круга (circulus vitiosus, как он называет его в одном из своих эссе).
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Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911), philosopher, social and political activist, thinker 
of ideas, witness of the epoch of crisis and its self-anointed prophet, has always been 
a controversial fi gure in Poland. His status and signifi cance have had their ups and downs. 
Between the wars he was condemned for the apparent collaboration with the tsarist secret 
police (the Okhrana) and almost completely forgotten. In the communist Poland, par-
ticularly in the 1950s and 1960s, he was approached with reserve and suspicion — Brzo-
zowski shared Marxist views but they were not orthodox enough, not to say heretical. It is 
not accidental that the only serious book written at that time — Czesław Miłosz’s Man 
Among Scorpions — was published in the West. Brzozowski’s reputation was somewhat 
improved in the 1970s, after excellent and now canonical studies by Leszek Kołakowski, 
Andrzej Walicki and Andrzej Mencwel, and after the publication, in 1970, of Brzozows-
ki’s letters. It does not mean that he was no longer an object of controversy and even scorn. 
However, the 1970s marked the beginning of serious and detailed discussion on the role 
and meaning of Brzozowski’s thought. 
The revival of Brzozowski the philosopher, the political activist and the critic (he was 
also a novelist) came as a surprise though in a way it could have been perfectly under-
standable, especially in the context of hot debates on the role of Polish intelligentsia that 
were taking place after 1990 and well into the fi rst decade of the XXI century. Brzozowski 
has returned and has become the main point of departure for many critical discussions 
centering around such issues as political involvement in the era of general distrust towards 
politics, the place and raison d’etre of the left-wing political parties, the meaning of indi-
vidual and social emancipation, questions involved in our understanding of modernity and 
postmodernity, and fi nally the role of politically committed literary criticism. The Renais-
sance of Brzozowski’s thought has been possible also because of the wide spectrum of is-
sues and problems posed as well as analyzed by the Polish thinker. Brzozowski cannot be 
pigeon-holed and discussed in the light of this or that fi eld of the humanities. His thought 
is, so to say, interdisciplinary and fi nds its momentum in crossing, or at least blurring, the 
borders between various areas of human activity. That is one of the reasons why his ideas 
are being recalled in all kinds of discussions, as either arguments or counter-arguments, 
and they rarely seem out of place.
Despite the widespread interest in Brzozowski his philosophy remains strangely elu-
sive. What is missing is a general interrogation of the project in its entirety and depth. 
Brzozowski’s work as a whole is not only problematic — in fact, it seems to resist all 
kinds of critical appreciation and evaluation. The thinker himself admitted many times 
that although his ideas may seem heterogeneous, they gravitate towards one or two central 
insights. But what are those insights? Can we articulate them? Are there any? I realize 
that the last of these questions is dramatic but, as matter of fact, it is the last question that 
interests me most. Brzozowski constantly changed his views but most of the commenta-
tors and critics agree that we can discern something like an evolution in his thinking. My 
contention, put in radical terms (and Brzozowski always considered himself a radical) is 
that what we have here is an evolution devoid of anything that might be called its teleology 
or predicate; just a pure and abstract process of evolving for its own sake. A far-reaching 
hypothesis, I know. But each time I read Brzozowski and try to grasp the gist of his phi-
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losophy, it all bursts and implodes, as if there was no gist at all. Accordingly, this paper is 
a brief recapitulation of my efforts at squeezing something out of Brzozowski and failing 
to do so. What I would like to say is not that his thought is unnecessary or pointless. There 
is a point but it is more about Brzozowski himself than about his ideas.
Critics writing about Brzozowski usually begin by pointing out the fact that we can 
distinguish several stages and turning points in his intellectual development. Accordingly, 
let me fi rst recapitulate in outline the development of Brzozowski’s thought (later on I will 
provide more details and complicate the picture).
The fi rst stage of Brzozowski’s intellectual quest was connected with his initial fas-
cination with what one of the critics called his «absolute individualism» and Selbstkultur. 
The fascination was a direct consequence of the thinker’s anti-positivist and anti-scientist 
sentiments, and led him to a brief appreciation of the then popular symbolist and decadent 
literary movements. The 1901 essay on Frederick Amiel, perhaps the fi rst signifi cant text 
written by the Polish philosopher, is an important case in point. In it, Brzozowski stresses 
moments of contemplation and insights as decisive in our attempts to do away with the 
scientifi c paradigms which fall short of showing the uniqueness of human consciousness. 
For one moment, Brzozowski became a spokesman of the «Young Poland» (Młoda Pol-
ska) movement, a group of artists and critics whose notions of art, culture and civilization 
echoed those of the French Symbolists. Here is a typical fragment which summarizes the 
fi rst phase in Brzozowski’s intellectual development:
Objective man is only a mirror image of everything which can be mirrored in him, 
of everything which can be known… What remains of his own individuality appears 
to him as merely an obstacle to the cognitive process. Thus, he has reduced himself 
to a mere point through which alien objects and events pass and in which they are 
mirrored. He reminds himself of himself with diffi culty and effort… sometimes he 
would like to concentrate on his own pains, forces himself to do so, but all in vain. His 
thought goes beyond his particular case…1
Very quickly, however, the philosopher voiced his strong disappointment and accused 
both Amiel and Polish decadent poets of «spiritual polymorphism». In 1903 he published 
two texts in which he criticized what seemed to him quietism, passivity and even nihilism 
inherent in the artistic ideas associated with the notion of the poet as seer and prophet. 
One of the essays was devoted to the philosophical insights of Richard Avenarius, Ger-
man-Swiss philosopher who propagated his concepts of empirio-criticism. The other pa-
per bore a signifi cant title «The Philosophy of Action» and included what was to become 
Brzozowski’s central idea of the human act as a form of life and a sign of man’s autonomy. 
The idea of the aesthetic pluralism was abandoned and gave way to an activist attitude 
and an assumption that the ego should exert conscious control over an alien world. Brzo-
 
1 Qtd in Andrzej Walicki, Stanisław Brzozowski and the Polish Beginnings of «Western Marxism», 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989, pp. 80–81. As the subsequent footnotes will show, I am heavily 
indebted to Walicki’s book. This is not only because the monograph is probably the best available 
exposition of Brzozowski’s views but also because this is the only English book-length study of the 
philosopher. At the same time, however, the main drift of my paper differs radically from Walicki’s 
propositions.
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zowski wrote: «The act is the only form through which we can have direct knowledge of 
reality… Free creation is the essence of the world. Action and creation are not an illusion 
but the highest truth»2. One can see the infl uence of Nietzsche but it should also be re-
membered that at the time Brzozowski started his anti-modernist campaign, and his view 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy was rather ambivalent. The philosophy of action, as understood 
by the Polish thinker, was much closer to the ideas shared by Fichte, Georg Simmel and 
Georgy Lukacs. 
Brzozowski’s growing fascination with Marx, reinforced by the revolutionary turmoil 
of 1905, brought with itself a different placing of the stresses. Now it was not so much the 
action undertaken by an individual but the labour understood as process and communal 
(communist) action that was at stake. 1906 marked Brzozowski’s reformulation of his phi-
losophy of action so that it became the «philosophy of labour» describing the never-end-
ing process of opposing the natural world, projecting oneself against it and winning one’s 
identity. It was at that time that he could write: «Man does not come to know being, but 
through his work creates his own basis in being… The world created by labour, subordi-
nated to labour, mastered by technology, constitutes humanity’s ontological foundation»3. 
We should not be deceived by the concluding words. Brzozowski strongly opposed any 
ontological thinking which for him was just an inoperative narrative devoid of intensity. 
The only criterion of humanity was involved in moments of inconclusive labour and con-
stant self-creation. All teleological aims were viewed by him as products of consciousness 
which can’t help escaping its own logocentric effects. 
It should be added that the post-1906 period resulted in Brzozowski’s most interesting 
and mature works. His analysis of the post-Enlightenment «illusions of rationality», his 
critique of the Engelsian determinism as well as appreciative remarks on the early Marxist 
philosophy, his detailed descriptions of the phenomenological underpinnings of human 
perception and cognition, his unique ability to include philosophical concepts with critical 
interpretations and social analyses — all these added up to what is rightly termed as a most 
noteworthy contribution to the XX century history of ideas. 
Before his death in 1911 Brzozowski got seriously interested in Henry Newman and 
the modernist variant of Catholicism. In a way, the turn, although surprising, was logical. 
Brzozowski gravitated towards the philosophy that would combine social and socialist is-
sues with anything which would provide them with a sanction, and which would transcend 
the limitations connected with the Marxist view of man as defi ned by community and 
labour. It remains problematic whether modernist Catholicism would fulfi ll Brzozowski’s 
maximum expectations. What we have is a handful of casual remarks and a few entries in 
a diary kept in the last months of his life. The philosopher stressed the fact that his interests 
lay in the communal and not theological or dogmatic dimension of Catholicism. He made 
 
2 Qtd in Dorota Kozicka, «Stanisław Brzozowski’s performative criticism» [in:] Studies in East 
European Thought, vol. 63, no. 4 (November 2011). Edited by Jens Herlth and Edward Swiderski. 
257–266. The quote is on p. 261.
3 Qtd in E. M. Swiderski, «Was Brzozowski a ‘constructionist’? A contemporary reading of 
Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’» [in:] Studies East European Thought, op. cit., 329–343. The 
quote is on p. 337.
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it clear that he was far from resorting to any kind of religious credo. His last statements are 
vague and ambiguous. All we can say for sure is that Brzozowski was not satisfi ed with the 
philosophy of labour and he was looking for a new metaphor of his existence.
Importantly, the brief overview I have just sketched does not do justice to the com-
plexity and ambiguity of the development of Brzozowski’s thought. The subsequent stages 
do not lend themselves to obvious or simple taxonomy. These are not just three or four 
distinct periods, one following another. In reality, we notice essential and far-reaching 
interdependencies between them. With each stage, Brzozowski comes to a point of contra-
diction but the whole process is a dialectical one: the view that has been rejected and aban-
doned is then a residual force («residual» in Raymond Williams’s sense) which haunts the 
thinker as a repressed possibility. Starting in 1901, when he published his fi rst important 
essay on Amiel, Brzozowski moved with such a speed that a detailed genealogy and trajec-
tory of his thinking is almost impossible. But it is not necessary, either. Commenting on 
the social philosophy of Georges Sorel, Brzozowski stressed that his French mentor was 
interested in thinking as a continuous and inconclusive process, and that what counted af-
ter all were not specifi c results but the thinking that might be shared with readers; thinking 
which could have opened a community. Thus, the very idea of intellectual development 
is for Brzozowski informed by the imperatives of intensity of the processes of conscious-
ness, and not by their net results (cognition, metaphysical narratives, and stable identity). 
In this perspective, talking about intellectual crises and new beginnings is not such a big 
deal after all. What is important is the quality of thinking.
It should be noted that the very term «development» is neither accurate nor relevant. 
True, the philosopher himself is repeatedly trying to give impressions of intellectual evo-
lution. We can fi nd in his statements a general supposition to the effect that the shifts from 
individualism to the philosophy of action to the philosophy of labor result from serious 
intellectual defi ciencies and inadequacies of the positions he took and then abandoned. In 
other words, Brzozowski attempts to point to the internal logic of the subsequent forms his 
thinking is taking on. However, we can easily observe that the arguments and counterargu-
ments used by the thinker are more or less the same, and the mechanism of their distribu-
tion and discrimination operate in a similar way throughout his whole life. Put briefl y, the 
mechanism is based on an apparent antinomy between a need to formulate something and 
a premise that the thought that has been formulated is no longer operative. In this perspec-
tive, any kind of philosophy or system abstracted from the actual thinking processes is 
always already dead. Brzozowski was terrifi ed by this and accordingly wanted to fi ll in the 
emptiness by referring to still other philosophical traditions and subscribing to more and 
more ideas that would guarantee that his thinking makes sense.
So, let us complicate the otherwise obvious taxonomy referring to his philosophy.
As I have just mentioned, Brzozowski’s initial interest in Amiel, Nietzsche and deca-
dent poetry gave way to a fascination with Fichte and the philosophy of action. The reason 
for this was that the Amiel-like individualism led to the state of tautological ego-centricity 
and then nihilism. As Andrzej Walicki puts it:
Brzozowski agreed that people of Amiel’s type are only spectators, organically unable 
to express themselves in action, but yet praised their supreme capacity to understand 
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different culture-bound world-views, their willingness to see relative truth everywhere 
while rejecting all forms of making any truth absolute. This richness of understanding 
was, in his view, a result of individuation, although, admittedly, a paradoxical one: it 
turned out, he thought, that strong, clear-cut individualities have to be wiped out by 
the rise of modern individualism. In other words, the price to be paid for individuation 
was individuality itself.4
What happened was that the «absolute individualism» revealed its basic contradic-
tion — it negated individuality in endless acts of cognition. In his 1903 essay on Avenarius 
Brzozowski remarks a number of times that cognition is necessarily circular. The self can-
not transcend itself and what it perceives is its own projection.5
At this point it is interesting to note that the circulus vitiosus which makes all state-
ments and truths merely self-referential is for Brzozowski a general and unavoidable law 
governing all kinds of intellectual activity. In contradiction to his, the Polish thinker turns 
to the idea of the action as sanctioning human thinking and life. Individual activity sets up 
a relation with the external world and thus helps to break the spell of the self’s tautology: 
the self may ground itself in something exterior. This was connected with Brzozowski’s 
fascination with Fichte about whom he had the following to say:
Fichte was right to deduce the ego from the principle of identity… If we reject the no-
tion of the ego, if we draw logical conclusions from the thought: I am not myself, I am 
only an outcome of some processes in nature, then everything immediately becomes 
shifting sand, written on by chance. Where there is no ego there are no values and 
everything depends on blind forces. Cease to believe in the ego and you will have to 
abandon your belief.6 
This Fichtean «strong individualism», however, led to another contradiction. Is it not 
the case that the action creates the external world? Can we separate it from the self? What 
Brzozowski noticed after two or three years was that the philosophy of action is strongly 
theoretical, dualistic and Cartesian in its radical juxtaposition of the thinking self and the 
inanimate reality. The act was supposed to be a medium between the two extremes, but 
the validity and legitimacy of the medium lay only in the individual self. Thus, the action 
which was to give the self an external sanction could have been validated only by the same 
self. Like before, the philosopher came up with a proposition which must have been sys-
tematic to be articulated. And like before, his thinking could not have aligned itself with 
the acts that were to express and validate it. 
What Brzozowski fi nally found was the philosophy of labour, anti-individualistic and 
community-based, inconclusive and postulating the «throwness» of human existence. As 
Walicki it, «Marxism provided Brzozowski with a solution to the main axiological prob-
lem of neo-Kantianism, of how to avoid relativism and endow at least some human values 
with a universally human validity»7. From that moment on, one can fi nd in Brzozowski 
 
4 Walicki, op. cit., p. 81.
5 Walicki, op. cit., pp. 81, 94.
6 Qtd in Walicki, op. cit., pp. 94–95.
7 Walicki, op. cit., p. 102.
44
STUDIA CULTURAE
many crucial Marxist ideas. For one thing, Brzozowski realized and put it in the strongest 
possible formulations that human consciousness is produced and shaped by external forc-
es. There is no consciousness as such. It is an effect and a function of natural conditions 
and social-economic relations. In striking contrast to Engels, however, and in agreement 
with the early Marx, Brzozowski made room for freedom. This blend of freedom and eco-
nomic conditions was articulated by the Polish philosopher in the following way: «If man 
is to be free he must fi rst master economic alienation which now rules over him; otherwise, 
all emancipations will remain in the sphere of illusion».8
As Brzozowski himself remarked in his seminal book Idee, «in recognizing the neces-
sity required by labour man, in fact, defends his freedom, because unrealized freedom is 
an illusion and only labour realizes freedom through providing man with a foundation in 
being which is obedient to his will».9 In consequence of his newly-won anti-individualistic 
views, Brzozowski stressed the communal dimension of labour though he never described 
that aspect of his philosophy in a precise way. Now it was the community which gave an 
absolute and supra-individual sanction to our lives, perceptions and thoughts.
As it quickly turned out, the philosophy of labour led to another contradiction — be-
tween the ideal of autocreation (we are free to construct and determine our lives and our-
selves) and the concept of labour which is teleological as it cannot be imagined without its 
outcome as the very defi nition of the word suggests that we have to do with production, 
be it material or intellectual. On the one hand, «Brzozowski’s ardent commitment to the 
view of human labour as capable of producing entirely new and unpredictable results led 
him to reject the very concept of ‘development’».10 In other words, through labour man 
creates himself in history. On the other hand, labour is seen here as a struggle with natural 
and social-economic determinants, and as such it has to be understood as a teleological 
enterprise. Thus, he is determined by the outcome of labour.
No wonder Brzozowski returned to his obsessive metaphor of the vicious circle. In his 
1910 essay «The Stages of Sentimentalism» he claimed: «There exists the circle of each 
life, understood as a creative life, the climate of ultimate things. But the ultimate things 
must not be created, no given results».11 In other words, life is absolute in the sense that 
it has its purpose. However, we cannot see it so and should reject thinking in teleological 
terms as it weakens and negates our existential freedom. 
It should be noted that the suspension of the teleological moment is purely psychologi-
cal. The idea of the purpose should be repressed but not abandoned. This is exactly at this 
point that the philosopher’s drama appears once again. Brzozowski could not have real-
ized that the repressed content returns as a ghost, a spectre, a nightmare of the dead-end 
street with no way out, a dilemma with no solution. You can reject the paradox but it will 
haunt you and will not let you out. 
 
8 Qtd in Walicki, op. cit., p. 105.
9 Qtd in Walicki, op. cit., p. 120.
10 Walicki, op. cit., p. 121.
11 Stanisław Brzozowski, Idee, Hachette, Warszawa 2011, p. 373 [translation mine — J. G.].
45
CONVENTIUS
The working of the mechanism apparently became evident to Brzozowski at the end 
of his life when he abandoned his philosophy of labour and turned, quite surprisingly, to 
questions of spirituality and the spiritual self. In fact, this was yet another variation on the 
same theme, but this time moved to a higher level. In a letter written in 1909 Brzozowski 
wrote: «I have never doubted that the essence of the world is spiritual, and that bodily 
life is important only as a place where our spiritual essence makes contact with the spirit 
outside us. You will ask what is spirit. My answer is: creating ourselves»12. The last two 
words should be stressed as they testify to the fact that the belief in the spiritual world was 
for Brzozowski a result of self-creation.
In another letter written in July 1909, two years before his death, the thinker tries to 
account for his unexpected accession to the ideas of Cardinal Newman and advocates of 
Christian modernism. His main argument is that all systematic notions are artifi cial and 
detached from life, and that the only way out of this deadlock is a complete rejection of the 
logic, or even logocentrism, of the Western thought: «Formulated thoughts are sterile»13. 
One can only guess that now Brzozowski realized how metaphysical and essentialist his 
notion of labour was. The teleological and historical language was dangerously close to 
the language of determinism which had haunted the Polish thinker under the guise of the 
tautological circle. The very idea of individual and then communal struggle carried with 
itself essentialist undertones and stood in striking contradiction to the idea of free and 
emancipated thinking.
Similar sentiments are present in Brzozowski’s Diary, composed in the last months 
of his life. The entries are dramatic as they reveal the basic drama of Brzozowski’s 
thought — the drama of an inability to give any kind of sanction to one’s beliefs and 
intuitions, which in its turn resulted from the premise that all forms of foundational think-
ing are contradictory in themselves: thinking processes are inconclusive and unstoppable; 
abstractions are necessarily separated from life and thus dead and gone; what survives is 
an endless dialectic of arguments and counterarguments, endlessly sublated, preserved and 
appearing in subsequent syntheses which do not synthesize anything but inform the never-
ending dialectical process. It would be wrong to maintain that Christian modernism might 
have provided Brzozowski with the fi nal rationale of his philosophy (if we can still use 
this term here). What he arrived at at the end of his life was just another contradiction that 
he would then try to overcome in still another dialectical move. As Walicki rightly notices, 
«[Brzozowski’s] attempts to add a transcendental dimension to his ‘philosophy of labour’ 
involved a contradiction which he accepted, without trying to fi nd a solution».14 
All of this sounds Hegelian, and it comes as no surprise that one of the most signifi cant 
entries in Brzozowski’s Diary is devoted to a discussion of Hegelianism. The points made 
by the Polish thinker are immensely interesting as they seem to refer to his own intellec-
 
12 Qtd in Walicki, op. cit., p. 159.
13 Stanisław Brzozowski, Listy [Letters], Edited by Mieczysław Sroka, Wydawnictwo Literackie, 
Kraków 1970, vol. 2, p. 170 [translation mine — J. G.].
14 Walicki, op. cit., p. 314.
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tual evolution. Responding to Karol Irzykowski’s claim that in the Hegelian perspective 
life is viewed as a «self-creating» and «self-realizing» agenda in which moments of self-
creation make human life inauthentic and nihilistic, Brzozowski argues that the Hegelian 
dialectic makes sense only if we refer it to life as a whole, that is, if we treat subsequent 
self-creations as negative stages in the development of the authentic and rational human 
being. In other words, everything that is, is rational, and all contradictory moments are just 
moments in the progress of the mind. This Hegelian formula, articulated by Brzozowski 
at the very end of his life, is surprising in Brzozowski and one can speculate that he would 
very quickly reject it. What should be noted is that by referring to Hegel’s dictum Brzo-
zowski returned to his point of departure — the reality is «swallowed» by the individual 
consciousness. Thus, the circle closed itself and was complete. The next step would be 
to question the all-embracing authority and tautology of the individual self. Obviously, 
this would mean repeating the same process that I have just outlined. A new circle would 
be opened, and a new tautology would present itself in the form of the apparently radical 
transgressions and emancipations. 
It is not diffi cult to see that the spectral and abyssal dimension of his philosophy 
haunted Brzozowski throughout his life. In fact, we can speak of the existentialist drama 
of life which attempts to fi nd its absolute sanction but fails to do so, and of man who tries 
to win his identity and self-presence but fi nds himself constantly determined by «dead 
thoughts» — arguments and counterarguments in their endless distribution, systematic 
and abstract narratives, conclusions detached from the actual thinking processes. As usual, 
Andrzej Walicki provides us with an accurate description of the state:
Brzozowski’s philosophy was always in motion, passing dialectically from one phase 
to another and constantly assimilating, in an original way, new and newer ideas. At the 
same time, it was remarkable for its capacity to preserve continuity in change, to en-
rich itself through confrontation with other currents of thought while never losing its 
peculiar focus and a distinctive style of its own15. 
The point is that the «peculiar focus» and the «distinctive style» were not enough. 
Brzozowski was looking for the ultimate and unquestionable foundation of his life, for 
something that would put a stop to the motion of his thinking and feel like a fulfi llment. This 
he could not have achieved, and we can only wonder if such a fulfi llment can be achieved.
Let me conclude with three points. 
Firstly, the moments of ambiguity and inconclusiveness are inherent to the philosophy 
of Stanisław Brzozowski — that is, they are its structural faults making it impossible to 
state anything specifi c about his ideas or arguments (as there are always counterargu-
ments and counter-ideas which are equally valid). Critics and commentators writing about 
Brzozowski usually point to the fact that the Polish thinker is vague, and that his state-
ments often contradict each other. But the complaint is very quickly dismissed. After all, 
Brzozowski himself was strongly critical of relativism and pragmatism and he stressed 
that his ideas have their existential, epistemological, communal, economic and political 
aims. Consequently, ambiguities and paradoxes of his thought are treated as accidental and 
 
15 Walicki, op. cit., p. 141.
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easily overwhelmed. My contention is that the philosophy of Brzozowski is meaningless 
and self-contradictory. There is in it only a free distribution of ideas which often crystallize 
into meaningful narratives but then are questioned and undermined by other narratives. In 
the long run nothing defi nite is said.
Secondly, self-contradiction and ambiguity which subvert Brzozowski’s thought do 
not have to be understood as nihilistic. Brzozowski anticipated many philosophical and 
intellectual tendencies and modes that would appear after his death (in some cases he 
expressed views which paralleled the then-existing philosophical positions, but it is quite 
probable that Brzozowski did not know about them). It should not be surprising as Brzo-
zowski was not only a fervent advocate of Marx and Nietzsche, two philosophers who 
exerted a great impact on the XX century thought, but managed to question their positions 
and do so in the spirit of their own philosophies. However, after pointing out the failures 
of the Western systematic philosophies and meta-narratives Brzozowski always returned 
to the circle of rationality. The point is that he did so, or at least tried to do so, by way of 
what Jean-Francois Lyotard called «paralogy» — that is, by contradicting himself and 
opening his discourses to the possibility of transgression (action, labour or a religious 
leap, to use his own ideas). That Brzozowski failed in this was due to the fact that he was 
not ready to question his own language and, consequently, he always got trapped in the 
Cartesian opposition of cogito (the thinking and speaking subject) and the inanimate mat-
ter (signs), the opposition that he wanted so desperately to avoid and question. In sum, 
Brzozowski’s insights could not have been fully or properly expressed as the language 
used by the Polish thinker, ostensibly transparent and straightforward, turned them into 
self-contradictory meta-narratives. Put simply, Brzozowski overlooked the fact that lan-
guage is neither transparent nor innocent — it is inherently rhetorical and inscribed into 
the endless tautology of constantly referring us to itself. 
Thirdly, Brzozowski might be said to be a pioneer of such intellectual formations as 
existential hermeneutics, philosophy of dialogue (in its Levinasian variant), deconstruc-
tive criticism and postmodernity. Also, his ideas easily and naturally adapt themselves to 
the philosophical projects of, say, Giorgio Agamben or Peter Sloterdijk. In other words, 
the philosophy of Brzozowski needs a serious revaluation, and it should fi nd its proper 
place on the map of the XX century Western thought. The trouble with the Polish philoso-
pher is that he was strangely blind to the rhetoric of his texts, overlooking their internal 
ambiguities and contradictions, apparent to anyone reading Brzozowski in a careful and 
detailed way. Still, it is obvious that the Polish thinker formulated and re-formulated the 
questions that would preoccupy the philosophers in the XX century.
What remains is the drama of a man who tried to fi nd the absolute sanction for his life 
and was not satisfi ed with partial answers. Perhaps that is why Brzozowski haunts his nu-
merous followers who refer to different aspects of his thought but have a sense that the gist 
of the matter is always elsewhere, not in the words, not in the texts which for Brzozowski 
were only dead, inoperative chronicles and memorials, but in something recurring and 
reappearing as a disturbance of the archive. This elusive disturbance, this non-recordable 
supplement, was I think Brzozowski’s curse and blessing.
